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HEDONIC DAMAGES: ABOVE AND BEYOND
SECTION 1983
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that a person is wrongfully killed. It does not
really matter who the victim is or why she lost her life; the
only relevant concern is that someone was unjustifiably divest-
ed of life. Further imagine that the victim's survivors success-
fully sue the wrongdoers and leave the computation of damag-
es as the only troubling issue remaining in the case. Yet this
determination is extremely complicated because the lost value
of life to the decedent is nearly impossible to measure due to
the difficulty of quantifying the intangible pleasures of life. To
say that a life is worth only a potential income stream or fig-
ures on an actuarial table is to forget about the good things
that make life worth living. It is especially tragic for someone
to be wrongfully deprived of life, and then the estate or loved
ones told that, according to the tables, the decedent just wasn't
worth that much.
No amount of damages from a tortfeasor' can properly
compensate the victim or his representatives for the loss of
life, but all American states have enacted statutes to try and
make up for the victim's loss. Every state provides various stat-
utory remedies for either the loss to the survivors,' the loss to
© 1991 by Jennifer L. Jones. I would like to dedicate this comment, and all
of my efforts toward its completion, with love, to my brother, Tom, 9/16/69 -
4/7/90.
1. A tortfeasor is defined as "[a] wrong-doer; one who commits or is guilty
of a tort." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1335 (5th ed. 1979) [hereinafter BLACK'S].
2. These states include: Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580 (1973)); Arizona
(ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-612 (1982)); Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-908,
27-909 (1979)); California (CAL. CIV. CODE § 377 (1978)); Colorado (CoLo REV.
STAT. §§ 13-21-201, 13-21-203 (1973)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 3704
(1982)); District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2701, 16-2703 (1981)); Hawaii
(HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-3 (1985)); Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70 § 2
(Smith-Hurd 1959); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-1904, 60-1905 (1976)); Louisi-
ana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2315 (1983)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A,
§ 2-804 (1981)); Maryland (MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-904 (1984));
Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (1985)); Michigan (MICH.
COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 600.2922 (1982)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.02
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the estate,3 or some combination thereof.4 Unfortunately, the
compensation afforded by such remedies is often inadequate
because the only factor given thorough consideration is the
economic value5 of the person. Statutes frequently focus, for
instance, on the amount of money the decedent would have
earned or contributions she might have made, but not what
her life was actually worth to her.
Arising from wrongful death cases,6 however, courts are
(1984)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (1982)); Missouri (MO. ANN. STAT.
§§ 537.080, 537.090 (1983)); Montana (MONT. CODE. ANN. § 27-1-323 (1981));
Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-810 (1979)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.085
(1979)); New Jersey (NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:314, 2A:31-5 (1982)); New Mexico
(N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-3 (1978)); New York (N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 16); North
Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1981)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 32-21-01, 32-21-02, 32-21-04 (1976)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2125.01,
2125.02 (1984); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1053 (1982)); Pennsylvania
(42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8301 (1982)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-10
(1971)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-15-20 - 15-15-40 (1977)); South
Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-5-7 (1979)); Texas (TEx. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. § 71.010 (1984)); Utah (UTAH CONST. art XVI, § 5); Vermont (VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14 § 1492 (1982)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-52, 8.01-54 (1977));
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.20.020 (1984)); West Virginia (W. VA.
CODE § 55-7-6 (1982)); Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.04 (1982)); and Wyo-
ming (WYO. CONST. art. X, § 4).
3. An estate is defined as:
The total property of whatever kind that is owned by a decedent
prior to the distribution of that property in accordance with the
terms of a will, or, when there is no will, by the laws of inheritance
in the state of domicile of the decedent. It means, ordinarily the
whole of the property owned by anyone, the realty as well as the
personalty.
BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 491.
These states include: Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-280 (1981));
Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 51-4-1 (1981)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 5-311 (1990));
and New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 556:12, 556:14 (1974)).
4. Comment, Wrongful Death Damages in Noih Carolina, 44 N.C.L. REV. 402,
405-07 (1966). See also M. BROOKSHIRE & S. SMITH, ECONOMIC/HEDONIC DAMAGES,
244-45, 258, for a brief discussion of states using alternative formulations.
5. Although definitions may vary, most economists agree that:
The economic value of life is normally considered the sum of earn-
ings, non-wage income and services one would contribute to the fami-
ly or household, less the dollar value of any reduction that may occur
in personal consumption in death cases. The methodology economists
use in estimating the economic value of life is fairly well-established.
Darnell, Economists Put Price on a Lfre, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 16, 1989, at 15.
6. A wrongful death action is a:
[t]ype of lawsuit brought on behalf of a deceased person's beneficia-
ries that alleges that death was attributable to the willful or negligent
act of another. Such action is original and distinct claim for damages
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beginning to consider what have been called "hedonic damag-
es."7 The main goal of these damages is to measure, as a sepa-
rate category of damages, the loss of the pleasure of being
alive to the decedent himself. This measurement is fraught
with controversy, for it is impossible to adequately estimate the
value of living. Nonetheless, juries in a few recent cases have
grappled with the problem and have arrived at conclusions as
to the value of life the victim can no longer enjoy. Problems
have subsequently arisen, however, as courts struggle to resolve
the conflict between traditional legal principles-assessing dam-
ages in wrongful death cases based solely on economic
worth-and this new and controversial damage theory.
The major discrepancies concern: (1) proof-while mathe-
matically feasible to conclude what a person could have earned
during a lifetime, calculations become less certain when at-
tempting to assess the value of losing life itself; (2) excessive
verdicts-damage awards are often already considered to be
exorbitantly high, without the addition of a new category of
damage recovery; and (3) closeness of fit-this discrepancy cen-
ters on the question of exactly how well hedonic damages meet
the established tort goal of compensation for the victim's loss-
es, rather than the unpermitted purpose of punishing a
tortfeasor. Courts now find themselves reconsidering the vari-
ous principles and purposes of damage theory in order to
grant a deserving plaintiff her full share of damage recovery.
This comment analyzes the history of hedonic damages
and addresses the issue of whether they should be awarded.
Further, given the principles underlying the hedonic damage
framework, it will be argued that hedonic damages logically
extend from principles of tort recovery and should be granted
when the circumstances warrant.
sustained by statutory beneficiaries and is not derivative of or continu-
ation of claim existing in decedent.
BLACK'S supra note 1, at 1446.
7. Hedonic damages were defined at trial as "refer[ring] to the larger value
of life, the life at the pleasure of society . . . the value including economic,
including moral, including philosophical, including all the value with which you
might hold life . . . .[That] is the meaning of the expression 'hedonic value'."
Sherrod v. Berry. 629 F. Supp. 159, 163 (N.D. III. 1985).
1991]
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II. BACKGROUND
The background of hedonic damage theory will be exam-
ined in four parts. First, the basic history of British wrongful
death awards will be discussed, since that is the area from
which loss of enjoyment of life damages originated. The devel-
opment of hedonic damages in Great Britain will also be re-
viewed. This background history aids in understanding subse-
quent changes by United States courts and evolutions in Cali-
fornia law. The second step is a similar analysis of U.S. law,
with emphasis on the applicable federal statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,8 and a look at cases arising beyond the scope of that
particular legislation. Courts in these latter cases have extend-
ed the damages originally recoverable under section 1983 to
other situations by extrapolating the purposes of hedonic dam-
ages beyond federal causes of action. Third, the comment con-
siders the development of wrongful death and loss of enjoy-
ment of life damages in California cases. The fourth step ana-
lyzes the extension of loss of enjoyment of life damages into
personal injury cases, as plaintiffs try to extend principles of
wrongful death recovery to situations where the victim has not
died.
A. Developments in Great Britain
1. Wrongful Death
In 1808,' Lord Ellenborough made the now-famous pro-
nouncement that "[i]n a civil [c]ourt, the death of a human
being could not be complained of as an injury."'" While the
opinion has been subsequently criticized," the statement sur-
vived and evolved to mean three things. First, if an injured
plaintiff died before judgment was entered against the defen-
dant, the cause of action did not survive the death of the plain-
8. Loss of life's pleasures awards and hedonic damages were first awarded
specifically out of a wrongful death action for a violation of that particular statute.
9. Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808).
10. Id.
11. For example, one such criticism noted that Lord Ellenborough "did not
cite authority or give supporting reasoning." Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398
U.S. 375, 383 (1970).
[Vol. 31
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tiff." Second, if a defendant died before judgment was ren-
dered against him, the plaintiff's cause of action expired as
well." In other words, a cause of action did not survive the
death of either the plaintiff or defendant. Third, the final ex-
tension ofLord Ellenborough's statement provides that no
separate cause of action exists for the decedent's depen-
dents. "
The first two interpretations have been subsequently reme-
died by so-called "survival statutes,""5 while the third con-
struction has been reformed by "wrongful death statutes."
16
Survival statutes allow a decedent's estate to bring suit for the
recovery of pain and suffering, medical expenses, and lost wag-
es resulting from the act leading to death. 7 Essentially the
survival claim extends the decedent's right to sue, and pre-
serves for the estate a cause of action for the infliction of pain,
suffering and related damages suffered by the decedent up to
the moment of death.
Wrongful death statutes, however, create a cause of action
for any wrongful act, neglect or default that causes death so as
to compensate the survivors for the loss of economic benefit
that the decedent would have given them.' While originating
in the same tortious act, the dissimilar theoretical bases for
wrongful death and survival statutes result in a difference be-
tween the measure of damages recoverable.' Survival statutes
12. D. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION, 394 (1985).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. A survival statute is defined as a "[sitatutory provision for tile survival,
after death of the injured person, of certain causes of action for injury to the
person whether death results from the injury or from some other cause. The
cause of action which survives is for the wi'ong to the injured person." BLACK'S,
supra note 1, at 1296.
16. Wrongful death statutes are defined as:
[s]uch statutes, which exist in all states, [that] provide a cause of ac-
tion in favor of the decedent's personal representative for the benefit
of certain beneficiaries (e.g. spouse, parent, children) against person
who negligently caused death of spouse, child, parent, etc. The cause
of action for wrongfil death permitted under such statutes is for the
wrong to the beneficiaries.
BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 1446.
17. BARRON'S LAw DIcTIONARY 467 (2d ed. 1984).
18. Id. at 522.
19. Wrongful death actions intend to compensate the survivors for the loss of
the decedent, while survival actions aim at compensating the decedent, albeit
through her representative. See text accompanying infil notes 182-84 for discussion
1991]
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allow the estate to act in place of the decedent by preserving
the decedent's claim; wrongful death statutes create a new
cause of action for the estate.2 °
The wrongful death doctrine dates back to 1846, when the
British Parliament enacted the Fatal Accident Act, known collo-
quially as Lord Campbell's Act.2 The Act provided that if a
defendant would have been liable to the decedent if death had
not occurred, the defendant would now be liable to the
decedent's estate.22 Yet despite the seemingly broad language
of the legal fiction of the representative "standing in place of" the decedent.
Logically, given the different purposes of the actions, divergent methods of
formulating damages are appropriate. Clearly, in determining the correct amount
of damages, an alternative calculation is required to ascertain loss to the decedent
than the method employed to determine the loss to the survivors occasioned by
the decedent's death.
20. Hedonic damages have sprung from wrongful death statutes, but due to
vague drafting of survival and wrongful death statutes, confusion has resulted,
often leading to denial of a valid recovery for mislabelled causes of action. For in-
stance, in the case of Singleton v. Suht; the court denied recovery because the jury
had found for the defendants and therefore issues of damages were moot. The
court noted, however, that even if the issue were relevant, loss of enjoyment of
life inappropriately measures damages in a wrongful death action brought for the
benefit of decedent's survivors, and should be denied. Singleton v. Suhr, 45 Ohio
St. 3d 715, 545 N.E.2d 907 (1989). See also Bass v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173
(7th Cir. 1985) (another such case where wrongful death actions were inappropri-
ately labelled as actions under survival statutes). See text accompanying infia notes
31-36, for discussion of courts incorrectly calling hedonic damage remedies under
wrongful death statutes. The purposes behind hedonic damage theory indicate
these remedies are closer in nature to prinicples behind survival statutes.
21. Act for Compensating the Families of Persons Killed by Accidents, 9 &
19 Vict., ch 93, 1-6 (1846). The Act states in relevant part that:
1. [W]hensoever the death of a person shall be caused by
wrongfil act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or default is
such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party in-
jured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof,
then and in every such case the person who would have been liable
if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages,
notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the
death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in
law to a felony.
2. [E]very such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, hus-
band, parent, and child of the person whose death shall have been so
caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor or
administrator of the person deceased; and in every such action the
jury may give such damages as they may think proportioned to the
injury resulting firom such death to the parties respectively for whom
and for whose benefit such action shall be brought.
Id.
22. Id. Note specifically the first paragraph, wherein language prolonging a
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of the Act, English courts restricted the amount of allowable
damages. In the subsequent case of Blake v. Midland Railway
Co.,23 the court established the standard that only pecuni-
ary24 losses were compensable in wrongful death cases. This
ruling substantially curtailed the role of the jury, as it provided
that if strictly pecuniary damages were allowed, only those inju-
ries capable of accurate measurement in monetary terms
would be redressed. The restriction prevented juries from be-
coming unduly creative in formulating damages.
2. Hedonic Damages
Although British courts awarded damages of a hedonic
nature for a period of time, they now prohibit such recoveries.
In the 1937 case of Rose v. Ford5 the House of Lords decided
that a wrongfully killed decedent's estate could sue the
tortfeasor for loss of expectation of life. 26 Subsequently, how-
ever, the English courts limited such damage awards to a nomi-
nal amount on the theory that it was too difficult to assess the
value of human life.2 7 In the case of Gammell v. Wilson,28 the
court arrived at a standard figure 29 for use in later situations,
thus easing the difficulty of valuing human life on an ad hoc
basis. Shortly after Gammell, the English Parliament abrogated
cause of action is contained.
23. 18 Q.B. 93, 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (Q.B. 1852).
24. Pecuniary damages are "such as can be estimated in and compensated by
money . . . all such loss, deprivation, or injury as can be made the subject of cal-
culation and of recompense in money." BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 353.
25. 1937 A.C. 826.
26. Id. The House of Lords decided this by interpreting Section 1 of the Law
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1934. The section states in relevant part
that, "subject to the provisions of this section, on the death of any per-son . . . all
causes of action subsisting against or vested in him shall survive against, or, as the
case may be, for the benefit of, his estate." Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, ch. 41, section 1, repinted in 17 HALSBURY'S STAT-
UTES OF ENGLAND 312 (4th ed. 1985).
27. See, e.g., White v. London Transp. Executive, [1982] 1 All E.R. 410;
Kandalla v. British Airways Bd., [1980] 1 All E.R. 341; Benham v. Gambling,
[1941] 1 All E.R. 7, 12-13.
28. [1980] 2 All E.R. 557.
29. Specifically, the court arrived at a conventional figure of £1250 that
would remain constant until inflation and monetary values required another
increase. Id. at 567-68. Using present day exchange rates of approximately 1.76
British Pound per American Dollar, that would mean that the court was giving
the equivalent of $2,200. This figure is not adjusted for inflation.
8151991]
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the rule allowing damages for loss of expectation of life, s°
and to this day, English plaintiffs cannot claim a separate dam-
age reward for loss of expectation of life.
B. Developments in American Law
1. Wrongful Death
Towards the end of the Nineteenth Century, American
jurisdictions, in fairly quick succession, passed wrongful death
acts." Most legislatures based their wrongful death acts on
the English model and limited awards to pecuniary damag-
es. 2 Generally, the amount of damages included the present
value of probable contributions which the decedent would
have made to the survivors. However, other states-a minority
of jurisdictions-allowed non-pecuniary damages, including
awards for mental anguish, sentimental value, companionship
and affection."3 Almost all states currently base damage cal-
culations on one of two methods. Under the first method,
plaintiffs' damages are calculated as the loss to the survivors
occasioned by the decedent's death, 4 while under the second
method, damages are measured as the loss to the estate.3 5
Notably, the first method is more closely akin to the theory be-
hind wrongful death statutes, while the latter formulation is
nearer in concept to survival statutes.36 Theoretical differenc-
es aside, both methods have proven to be acceptable standards
in formulating damages in wrongful death cases.
Interestingly, hedonic damage cases sprung from wrongful
death actions, under the applicable wrongful death statutes.
Yet, hedonic damages measure the loss of enjoyment of life to
the decedent, leading to the conclusion that they should be
30. "In an action . . . for damages for personal injuries ... no damages
shall be recoverable in respect of any loss of expectation of life caused to tile
injured person by the injuries .... " Administration of Justice Act, 1982, cl. 53,
§ 1, repinted in 13 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGL.ND 542 (4th ed. 1985).
31. Such an act now exists in every American state. See Comment, supra note
4, at 402-03.
32. Comment, supra note 4, at 404-05.
33. Comment, supra note 4, at 410-11.
34. Cohen, Toward an Economic Theoy of the Measurement of Damages in a
Wrongful Death Action, 34 EMORY L.J. 295, 299 (1985).
35. Id.
36. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text for background history of
wrongful death and survival statutes.
816 [Vol. 31
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brought under the applicable survival statutes. State survival
laws properly measure loss to the decedent, whereas wrongful
death actions measure loss to the estate. This apparent mistake
is not explained in any existing case law, so it can be assumed
that courts have been unaware or unconcerned of the error.
Despite the fact that hedonic damages would be more accu-
rately characterized as having developed from survival statutes,
this fact does not detract from their value.
2. Hedonic Damages Under Section 1983
a. Background of Section 1983
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code,
37
providing a federal cause of action for violations of protected
civil rights, served as the main arena of hedonic damage devel-
opment."8 Specifically, section 1983 actions focus on miscon-
duct by a governmental actor," and the provision, a civil
rights action, awards damages in order to achieve two main
purposes: to compensate an injured plaintiff and to deter fur-
ther civil rights violations.4" Although permitting a cause of
action for deprivations of constitutionally protected rights of
the victim, section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for
the benefit of decedent's estate.
To fill in the gaps when section 1983 failed to provide a
remedy, Congress enacted section 1988 of United States Code
Title 42"' to provide procedural guidelines for section 1983
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) [hereinafter section 1983]. Section 1983 provides
that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to tile depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress.
38. In fact, tile termi hedonic damages was first used in a section 1983
action. See text accompanying infil notes 65-71 for a discussion of the first hedon-
ic damage case.
39. Section 1983, supia note 37. See also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640
(1980), where the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff bringing an action under
section 1983 must allege that (1) some person deprived the plaintiff of a federal
right, and (2) the person acted under color of state law.
40. See, e.g., Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1978); Bell v. City
of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1239 (7th Cir. 1984).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) [hereinafter section 1988]. Section 1988 in part
1991]
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actions and to act as a safeguard mechanism. Specifically, sec-
tion 1988 directs the federal judiciary to apply state law when
federal law inadequately protects the section 1983 goals of (1)
compensation for the plaintiff, and (2) deterrence of future
tortfeasors.42 Thus, if a federal court hearing a section 1983
action determines that the existing federal law is inadequate, it
can apply the state law if such state law compensates for the
inadequacy or deficiency in the federal law. Although section
1983 does not specifically address a cause of action by the
decedent's estate, section 1988 authorizes a court to extend
section 1983 to cover such situations by using state remedies.
In fact, the United States Supreme Court in Robertson v.
Wegmann,43 held that when federal law is inadequate to re-
dress section 1983 violations, section 1988 requires federal
courts to apply state law, unless those state laws contradict the
policies of section 1983. In summary, to properly determine
awards in section 1983 actions, federal courts must first study
federal law, and then, if federal law is insufficient to adequate-
ly compensate plaintiffs, the court must turn to state remedies.
Such state remedies have often included the decedent's lost
future earnings, pain and suffering, medical and funeral ex-
penses, as well as survivors' loss of companionship and affec-
tion. With few exceptions, however, state courts have histori-
cally not included damages for loss of expectation of life.44
reads:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on tile district
courts by the provisions of this [chapter and Title 18], for tile protec-
tion of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for
their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with
the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry
the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to
the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suit-
able remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as
modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State
wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is
held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said
courts in the trial and disposition of the cause.
42. Id. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 n.13 (1978) (section 1983
allows federal courts to use state law to replace inadequate federal law for section
1983 remedies). The exception to this rule occurs when state law conflicts with
the Constitution or federal law. Under the supremacy clause of the Constitution,
such inconsistent state law becomes invalid. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
43. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
44. See, e.g., Runyon v. District of Columbia, 463 F.2d 1319, 1321-22 (D.C.
818 [Vol. 31
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Thus, as one commentator accurately noted, federal courts
"derived . . . existing section 1983 remedies for the unconstitu-
tional deprivation of a person's life from state wrongful death
and survival action remedies."45 This statement is a logical
extension from the fact that section 1988 leads a court to pos-
sible state remedies for the section 1983 violation. The Rob-
ertson Court directed federal courts to apply state law if neces-
sary; the same Court in another case, Carey v. Piphus,46 fur-
ther authorized federal courts to create appropriate remedies
for the particular injury in section 1983 actions if neither state
nor federal law provided an adequate remedy. 7 The Court
emphasized that the basic purpose of section 1983 is compen-
sation for the victims" and thus liberal interpretation of stat-
utes is appropriate.
A federal court relied on Carey to fashion adequate awards
in Bell v. City of Milwaukee,49 which upheld a jury verdict of
$100,000 to the decedent's estate for his loss of life and enjoy-
ment thereof.5 Agreeing that the Wisconsin state law barring
recovery for loss of life acted inconsistently with the policies
behind section 1983 and the fourteenth amendment's protec-
tion of life,5' the U.S. Court of Appeals held that section
1983 allowed a claim for loss of enjoyment of life." The
court noted that section 1983 "was not intended to incorpo-
rate.., restrictive damage limits""3 and cited federal cases
Cir. 1972); Weaver v. Ford Motor Co., 382 F. Supp. 1068, 1076-77 (E.D. Pa.
1974), aff'd 515 F.2d 507 (3rd Cir. 1975); Balmer v. Dilley, 81 Wash. 2d 367,
370-71, 502 P.2d 456, 458-59 (1972) (these cases discuss recovery for loss of future
earnings); Heffner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 265 Pa. Super. 181, 190, 401 A.2d 1160,
1164 (1979) (this case discusses damages for pain and suffering prior to death); In
tv Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, Louisiana, 795 F.2d 1230, 1236 (5th Cir.
1986); Platt v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 554 F. Supp. 360, 361 (E.D. Mich. 1983)
(cases allowing damages for loss of decedent's love, companionship or affection).
45. Note, Hedonic Damages in Section 1983 Actions: A Remedy for the Unconstitu-
tional Deprivation of Life, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 321, 336 (1987).
46. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
47. Id. at 258-59.
48. Id. at 254-55.
49. 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984).
50. Id. at 1279.
51. Id. at 1239-40.
52. Id. at 1240. It should be remembered that hedonic damages include loss
of enjoyment of life damages as a component part. Thus Bell can logically be the
first loss of enjoyment of life damages case without being a hedonic damage case.
53. Id. at 1240 (discussing Sanchez v. Marquez, 457 F. Stipp. 359 (D. Colo.
1978)).
8191991]
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where state laws precluding various recoveries were ruled in-
consistent with section 1983 policies.5 4 The court concluded
that laws precluding recovery for loss of enjoyment of life were
incompatible with section 1983 goals, and allowed the damage
awards.
Bell was a notable decision in another aspect as well: Previ-
ously, the United States Supreme Court had concluded that
municipalities were immune from punitive damage awards in
section 1983 actions.55 Lower courts were therefore cautious
when awarding large recoveries to cite the damages as com-
pensatory or deterrent in nature, rather than as punitive.5"
While distinguishing between the deterrent effect of loss of life
damages and the punishing effect of punitive damages,5 the
Bell court went on to state that punitive damages were in fact
awardable in section 1983 actions.5 Besides allowing for a
new type of damage remedy, the maverick Bell court also made
municipalities prone to punitive awards for their wrongdoings.
Buttressing the Bell decision, a later court of appeals in
Bass by Lewis v. Wallenstein5 ' addressed the issue of appropri-
ate damages if state law acted inconsistently with the compen-
satory and deterrent policies of section 1983. Significantly cit-
ing Bell, the court concluded that "in a section 1983 action, the
estate may recover damages for loss of life,"6" as well as con-
scious pain and suffering experienced by the decedent prior to
death.6'
Hedonic damage theory has not yet been presented to the
United States Supreme Court, but nevertheless, that Court has
previously held that damages held based on the abstract "val-
ue" or "importance" of a constitutional right in section 1983
54. Id. at 1237-38. Te court discussed a series of cases where courts fash-
ioned remedies to compensate for insufficient state awards. Accord, Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
55. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
56. See, e.g., Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Stipp. 1554 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(court focused on deterrent aspect of the damage award); Robertson v. Wegmann,
436 U.S. 584 (1978) (court emphasized the compensation aspect of the award).
57. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F. 2d 1205, 1279-80 (7th Cir. 1984).
58. Id. at 1241.
59. 769 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1985).
60. Id. at 1190.
61. The court, however, denied relief to the plaintiff because damages were
erroneously awarded as in a survival action when the action was more properly
characterized as one of wrongful death. Id.
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cases are inappropriate. 2 The concern seems to be that juries
will award excessive damage amounts without a proper eviden-
tiary basis. Such damages are inappropriate because they fail to
address what harm was actually suffered. The Court has also
warned that the "goal of compensating those injured by a de-
privation of rights provides no basis for requiring compensa-
tion of one who is merely suing as the executor's estate."6
Clearly the Supreme Court is concerned that the compensa-
tion aims will be abused and the estate will receive a windfall.
The Court has carefully noted that the purpose of compensa-
tion in section 1983 cases is for the individual whose rights
were infringed, not for his or her estate. 4
b. Sherrod v. Berry-The First Hedonic Damages Case
A section 1983 case, Sherrod v. Berry, 5 was the first to use
the term hedonic damages and to allow proffered testimony
and evidence to prove that the decedent's life had a value
greater than his financial worth. Unlike earlier section 1983
cases, in which plaintiffs had asked for non-pecuniary damages
for loss of enjoyment of life, this case introduced hedonic dam-
age theory when the plaintiff specifically requested "hedonic
damages."66 While prior courts struggled to allow loss of en-
joyment of life damages in any capacity, Sherrod was the first
case in which such a remedy was awarded as a completely dis-
crete and insular damage category. The jury awarded $850,000
of a $1.6 million verdict for the hedonic value of Sherrod's
life.6 The Sherrod district court accepted the definition of he-
donic value as compensation for a person's loss of life and
pleasures of living.6" Additionally, the court sustained the
62. Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
However, it seems as though the court is considering the value of a right, and
not the value of life itself.
63. Robertson v. Wegniann, 436 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
64. Id.
65. 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. 111. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 802
(7th Cir. 1988). The case was originally affirmed at 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987),
but was later partially reversed at 835 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1988) on grounds not
related to the scope of this comment.
66. See supra note 7 for a definition of hedonic damages.
67. Shermd, 629 F. Supp. at 160.
68. Id. at 163. Shemod went beyond previous loss of enjoyment of life cases
by asking for the additional component of loss of the pleasures of living.
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plaintiff's argument that hedonic value includes the totality of
a person's existence, and that such totality includes the eco-
nomic, moral, and philosophical values that society places on
life.69 Furthermore, since the court added that enjoyment of
life and expectations of future pleasures are also elements of a
person's hedonic evaluation, ° a strong nexus was established




3. Fundamental Assumptions Behind Hedonic Damage Theoy
The Sherrod jury received assistance from expert witness
and economist Stanley Smith, instrumental in creating the
formulative process of hedonic damage assessment.72 Smith
claims that in analyzing hedonic value, certain assumptions
must be made and explained to the jury.73 The first presump-
tion states that the hedonic value of life to a person of great
wealth does not necessarily prove greater than the hedonic
value to a person with little or no income.7 ' Elaborating on
this proposition, Smith explains that every person's hedonic
value is independent of anyone else's hedonic value, and that
in calculating the appropriate measure of damages, a person's
wealth, social stature, etc., are invalid and irrelevant consider-
ations. Smith's second assumption postulates that a person's
hedonic value calculation should be independent of social
rank, education, wealth, gender, family position or other simi-
lar characteristics. 75 In other words, the hedonic damage con-
siderations are consistent whether the decedent was
well-educated and from a prominent family or was a poor,
illiterate migrant worker. The third principle posits that a
person's hedonic value is related to his life expectancy. 76 Gen-
69. Id.
70. Id. at 163-64.
71. In formulating loss of enjoyment of life damages, a plaintiff offers evi-
dence as to how the decedent cannot enjoy tie pleasures of life anymore. In
hedonic damage formulation, a plaintiff offers expert testimony as to how to value
the pleasures of life that can no longer be enjoyed.
72. Shem,4 629 F. Supp. at 162.
73. Smithb, Hedonic Damages in Wpngffid Death Cases, 74 A.B.A. J. 70 (Sept. 1,
1988).





erally, a person of age twenty has a greater hedonic value than
someone of age seventy. Also, any future year of a person's
expected life has the same value regardless of the person's ac-
tual age. So the hedonic value of a person's twentieth year
when she is nineteen is the same as the value of her fiftieth
year when she is forty-nine because, it is assumed, people value
every year of the future the same." The last assumption
states that it is appropriate to value the future years of a
person's life with a zero real discount rate.78
Once the jury understands these premises, it can evaluate
economic evidence as a means of differentiating various meth-
ods used by economists to value life. There are three main
economic approaches to determine hedonic value: wage differ-
ential, consumption behavior, and willingness to pay to avoid
risk."9 Wage differential examines the differences in compen-
sation between hazardous and non-hazardous occupations to
determine how much pay people will forego in order to avoid
a dangerous job. By use of the second school of
thought-consumption or use of life-preserving activi-
ties-economists can convert figures about how much a person
would pay for a fail-safe seat belt or smoke detector to figure
out just how the respondent is really valuing a human life.
Other data comes from existing government expenditures,
which reflect standards of value of life and from which infor-
mation can be gathered on what the government spends on
safety items. Finally, the last approach, as the name suggests,
measures what people will pay to avoid risk. This is the most
common type of hedonic damage measurement because sur-
veys can be taken quite easily. For instance, economists can
distribute questionnaires, from whose answers the analysts can
infer the value respondents place on human life. There is no
one firm methodology for determining hedonic value, but
from this information, Smith argues, a juror can add his own
moral and philosophical views to arrive at a just damage
award.8" Hedonic value, he claims, can range from three to




78. Smith, Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 74 A.B.A. J. 70 at 72.
79. Glennie, Economists Can Assist with Proof, NAT'L L.J. (Sept. 5, 1988).
80, Smith, Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 74 A.B.A. J. 70 at 73.
81. Id.
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4. Hedonic Damages Outside Section 1983
Hedonic damage awards have, until recently, only been
tried via civil rights violation cases. "[M]ost states won't accept
a demand for hedonic damages unless it is brought under Sec-
tion 1983, "" yet some states have done so: The Connecticut
Supreme Court decision of Katsetos v. Nolan"3 was a case
where a decedent's estate recovered damages for the loss of
life's enjoyment in a wrongful death case outside section
1983.4 In fact, Connecticut was the first state allowing expan-
sive loss of enjoyment of life damages outside section 1983.5
The court based its reasoning on the theory that the plaintiff
in a wrongful death situation is entitled to 'just damages, to-
gether with the cost of reasonably necessary medical, hospital
and nursing services, and including funeral expenses." 6 The
court effectively interpreted the state's relevant statutory allow-
ance of 'just damages" to include "compensation for the de-
struction of [the decedent's] capacity to carry on and enjoy
life's activities in a way [the decedent] would have done had
[the decedent] lived"" without limiting these damages to gov-
ernmental tortfeasors. Katsetos, as a state loss of enjoyment of
life case, laid the groundwork for later state hedonic damage
cases.
The New Jersey federal district court recently addressed
the viability of hedonic damages in a case arising outside of
section 1983. In Clement v. Consolidated Rail Co.,"8 the court
noted that allowance of hedonic damages could not be based
upon Sherrod v. Bery, since the Sherrod court based its analysis
82. Sherod defense attorney Andrew Hlorwitz, quoted in 73 A.B.A. J. 21 (Nov.
1, 1987).
83. 170 Cont. 637, 368 A.2d 172 (1976).
84. See also Mather v. Criffin Hosp., 207 Conn. 125, 540 A.2d 666 (1988)(loss of enjoyment of life not duplicative of other damage elements); Kiniry v.
Danbury Hosp., 183 Conn. 448, 439 A.2d 408 (1981) (jury can consider
decedent's loss of life and loss of ability to enjoy life's activities in awarding
damages); Waldron v. Raccio, 166 Conn. 608, 353 A.2d 770 (1974) (estate can
recover for decedent's loss of ability to enjoy life's activities).
85. Previously, decisions were tunder section 1983, and were decided by feder-
al courts.
86. Katsetos, 170 Conn. at 648, 368 A.2d at 183.
87. Id. at 648, 368 A.2d at 183.
88. 734 F. Stipp. 151 (D.NJ. 1989).
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using section 1983 principles."s Instead, the court predicted
what the New Jersey Supreme Court would do if it were pre-
sented with a hedonic damage case and concluded that under
the proper circumstances, that court would permit the recov-
ery." The district court observed a "growing trend in juris-
dictions across the country to permit juries to consider loss of
life's enjoyment in some manner when awarding damages."91
The court expressly denied that hedonic damages were puni-
tive in nature and instead, directly stated that hedonic damag-
es constituted a measure of compensation.92 The purpose of
this statement may have been to emphasize the positive aspect
of compensation inherent in hedonic damages, rather than the
negative aspect of punishment. A court would prefer to com-
pensate an injured plaintiff rather than punish the defendant,
possibly in deference to the tort goal of compensation.
Highlighting the controversy in the matter, the U.S. dis-
trict court in Delaware, predicting how that state's supreme
court would decide the issue, ruled to the contrary in Sterner v.
Wesley College."3 The district court noted that Delaware's high-
est court had observed that "Pennsylvania's survival act was the
source from which Delaware's [survival statute] apparently was
taken" 4 and Pennsylvania does not allow hedonic damag-
es. 5 Therefore, the Sterner court decided that hedonic damag-
es would be inappropriate under Delaware's relevant statute.
Interestingly, however, the court added that the plaintiffs were
entitled to "offer evidence of the hedonic value of the
decedent's life only to the extent that it is relevant as a mea-
sure of the decedent's pain and suffering in the time between
the [accident] ... and decedent's death." 6 This'arguably indi-
89. Id. at 153.
90. Id. at 153-55.
91. Id. at 154.
92. Id. at 154-55.
93. 747 F. Supp. 263 (D. Del. 1990).
94. Id. at 266.
95. Id. (citing Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, 393 A.2d 1188 (Pa.
1978)).
96. Id. at 267. The court reasoned that:
[u]nless we are to equate loss of life's pleasures with loss of life itself,
we must view it as something that is compensable only for a living
plaintiff who has suffered from that loss. It follows that ...damages
for the pain and suffering that may flow from the loss of life's plea-
sures should only be recoverable for the period of time between the
19911
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cates that the court was not placing a flat ban on hedonic dam-
ages, but only prohibiting them as a separate category of recov-
ery.
Another jurisdiction has also denied hedonic damage re-
covery. The 1990 case of Gonzales v. City-Wide Insulation,97 es-
tablished the proposition that the Illinois Wrongful Death Act
does not provide for recovery of hedonic damages." While
the case first allowing hedonic damages was an Illinois
case-Sherrod v. Berryg-the Gonzales court interpreted the
state's wrongful death statute, while the Sherrod court analyzed
the state's remedies for a section 1983 violation.
C. Developments in California
1. Wrongful Death
The California legislature enacted the state's first wrongful
death statute in 1862 and provided for pecuniary and exem-
plary damages0 . considered fair and just under the circum-
stances.'' Although a later amendment removed the words
"pecuniary and exemplary," the statute remains the same to-
day, and includes, in part, that "damages may be given as un-
der all the circumstances of the case,. may be just."' °2
accident and the decedent's death."
Id.
97. Gonzales v. City-Wide Insulation, Inc., 1991 WL 2532 (N.D. III. 1990).
98. Id. at 3-4.
99. Further, the court in Birdsell v. Board of Fire and Police Conn'rs, No.
85-3371 (C.D. III. Oct. 16, 1990), refused to consider Shennd as controlling prece-
dent because the case was remanded. Importantly, however, Shernod was reversed
on items entirely unrelated to hedonic testimony.
100. "Damages on an increased scale, awarded to plaintiff over and above what
will barely compensate him for his property loss, where wrong done to him was
aggravated by circumstances of violence, oppression, malice, fraud, or wanton and
wicked conduct on part of defendant." BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 513.
101. The Death by Wrongful Act Statute, 1862 Cal. Stat. 447, reprinted in 1
GENERAL LAWS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 322 (1870). The Act reads in part
that "[t]he jury may give such damages, pecuniary and exemplary, as they shall
deem fair and just." d.
102. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1989). The Code provides in
part that:
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or neglect
of another, his or her heirs or personal representatives on their be-
half may maintain an action for damages against the person causing
the death of such wrongdoer, against the personal representative of
such wrongdoer, whether the wrongdoer dies before or after the
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Despite the broad language of California's 1873 amend-
ment removing restrictive award limitations, state courts acted
conservatively in awarding damages. Pecuniary loss limitations
in the state were firmly established in the seminal case of
Munro v. Pacific Coast Dredging Reclamation Co.,0'3 wherein
the court allowed damages for pecuniary loss, the loss of com-
fort, support, society, and protection of the deceased. Howev-
er, the court refused to permit recovery for mental anguish,
claiming that allowing a jury to find damages for mental an-
guish and grief would give free rein to return extremely exces-
sive verdicts." 4  Shortly thereafter,"'5 the California Su-
preme Court determined that recovery for comfort, support,
society, and protection would also be limited to those damages
specifically measurable in monetary terms." 6
Eventually, however, the California Supreme Court ex-
panded recovery when it concluded that some aspects of
wrongful death damage awards were not pecuniary in nature.
In Krouse v. Graham,"'7 the court reflected on the circularity
and illogic of limiting the plaintiffs recovery to pecuniary loss-
es, while permitting some compensation for nonpecuniary
losses (as in Lange) such as society, comfort, and protection of
a decedent. 0 8 The court proceeded to allow some
non-pecuniary losses, but specifically denied recovery for men-
tal anguish.'0 9 Currently, California judges instruct juries to
consider damages for "loss of love, companionship, comfort,
affection, society, solace or moral support," and if applicable,
loss of enjoyment of sexual relations, and loss of enjoyment of
assistance in the home, but not for grief or sorrow suffered by
wrongful death plaintiffs."0
death of the person injured .... In every action under this section,
such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the
case may be just, but shall not include damages recoverable under
Section 573 of the Probate Code.
103. 84 Cal. 515, 24 P. 303 (1890).
104. 'Id. at 524-25, 24 P. at 305.
105. 115 Cal. 388, 47 P. 139 (1896).
106. Id. at 391, 47 P. at 139.
107. 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977).
108. Id. at 69, 562 P.2d at 1026, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
109. Id. at 70, 72, 562 P.2d at 1027, 1028, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 868, 869.
110. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 14.50 (7th ed. 1986). The instruc-
tions include in part that, "[i]n determining the loss which each heir has suffered,
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2. Section 1983
The California federal district courts have long debated
whether a decedent's loss of enjoyment of life was a compensa-
ble injury for the estate under a section 1983 action."' Even
before the Bell court allowed damages for decedent's loss of
enjoyment of life, the California court in Guyton v. Phillips"2
addressed the issue of whether a decedent's loss of enjoyment
of life in a section 1983 action was a viable claim for the es-
tate. The Guyton court accepted the reasoning that the depriva-
tion of life epitomizes the most outrageous violation of a
person's rights and that therefore, a high damage award is not
excessive." 3 Agreeing that federal courts can create remedies
in section 1983 actions to promote the aims of compensation
and deterrence,"1 4 the court further concluded that the best
method of reducing the lost enjoyment of life to a monetary
figure would be to compare awards in other factually similar
situations. 115 The Guyton court, stressing the compensatory
aims of section 1983, was the first in California to allow a rem-
edy for loss of life to the estate of a decedent in a section 1983
action.
Loss of life damages were again awarded in Roman v. Rich-
mond." 6  Emphasizing the deterrence aim of section
1983,"' the court concluded that a loss of enjoyment of life
damage would inhibit future deprivations of life."' The
[juries] are not to consider: 1. Any pain or suffering of the decedent; 2. Any grief
or sorrow of his heirs; or 3. The poverty or wealth of any heir."
111. However, neither tile California state courts nor federal district courts
have addressed loss of enjoyment of life damages in cases arising outside section
1983.
112. 532 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
113. Id. at 1167.
114. Id. at 1167-68. See also supa notes 40-41 and accompanying text for dis-
cussion of federal court creation of remedies to promote section 1983 aims.
115. Id. at 1168. The court noted that Guyton's future earnings, as a black
male, would be less than those of white males similar background and education.
"It would be ironic that under the very Act that was intended to protect tile
rights of black citizens the measure of damages incorporated the proscribed
discrimination." Id.
116. 570 F. Supp. 1554 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
117. Id. at 1557. This is notable since most courts previously stressed the com-




court noted the logical inconsistency that an injured plaintiff
in a section 1983 action could obtain large damage awards for
medical treatments, while a decedent plaintiff could only recov-
er limited damages." 9 Under such a bizarre scheme, a
tortfeasor could conceivably be liable for less damages as a
result of killing someone as opposed to permanently maiming
him. After Roman cemented the principles of Guyton, Califor-
nia courts had a strong base to allow damages for loss of enjoy-
ment of life's activities.
D. Loss of Enjoyment of Life in Personal Injury Cases
The application of enjoyment of life damages has been
extended to personal injury cases. In Leiker v. Gafford, 2' the
Supreme Court of Kansas ruled that loss of life in a personal
injury action is not a separate component of nonpecuniary
damages, but is properly an element of pain and suffering or
disability. 21
Citing Leiker approvingly in a subsequent decision, 22 the
Kansas Supreme Court repeated that loss of enjoyment of life
is interwoven with disability and pain and suffering. 2 While
admitting that, arguably, loss of enjoyment of life is a distinct
category of damages deserving of separate consideration, the
court "took the more realistic approach" that such an award
may result in the duplication of damages.'
24
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the
notion that loss of enjoyment of life is a separate element of
pain and suffering in McDougald v. Garber.2  The court ac-
knowledged that while recovery for loss of enjoyment is a valid
damage request, it is subsumed by the pain and suffering
award; therefore, the court reasoned, to allow a separate cause
of action would permit double recovery.'26 The court con-
cluded that such overpayment fails to satisfy the aim of tort
recovery (compensation), and would instead grant a windfall to
119. Id.
120. 245 Kan. 325, 778 P.2d 823 (1989).
121. Id. at 340, 778 P.2d at 835.
122. Gregory v. Carey, 791 11.2d 1329 (1990).
123. Id. at 1336.
124. Id.
125. 73 N.Y.2d 246, 536 N.E.2d 372, 538 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1989).
126. Id. at 256-57, 536 N.E.2d at 375-77, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 940-41.
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the estate. The court also focused on a cost/benefit type analy-
sis, and stated that the true issue of the case is "whether an
award of damages for loss of enjoyment of life to a person
whose injuries preclude any awareness of the loss serves a
compensatory purpose. We conclude that it does not." '27 In
McDougald, the court determined that an award of damages for
loss of life's pleasures serves a punitive rather than compensa-
tory purpose.' A companion case, Nussbaum v. Gibstein,
129
further held that loss of enjoyment of life is not a separate
element of damages deserving of a distinct award, but is, in-
stead, only a factor to be considered by the jury in assessing
damages for conscious pain and suffering.' This same con-
clusion was reached in Leonard v. Parrish,'' wherein the Min-
nesota Appeals Court found a general instruction on damages
appropriate, rather than a separate jury instruction on loss of
enjoyment of life. Clearly, the extension of loss of enjoyment
of life damages to personal injury cases is an uphill battle,
although courts appear amenable to allow hedonic testimony
as part of the pain and suffering category.
California courts similarly addressed the issue of loss dam-
ages in personal injury cases. In Huff v. Tracy'32 the Court of
Appeals held that separate damages for loss of enjoyment of
life were inappropriate. The court focused on elements of gen-
eral damages in California-permitting recovery for pain, dis-
comfort, fears, anxiety and other mental and emotional dis-
tress suffered by the plaintiff'3 -and concluded that loss of
enjoyment of life is included in the aforementioned categories.
The court emphasized that the issue was "not the propriety of
127. Id. at 254, 536 N.E.2d at 375, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
128. Id. at 254, 536 N.E.2d at 375, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 940. But cf Kelavity v.
United States, 584 F.2d 809, 811 (6th Cir. 1978); Clement v. Consolidated Rail,
734 F. Supp. 751 (1989). li these two cases, the courts stressed that hedonic dam-
ages were not punitive in nature.
129. 73 N.Y.2d 912, 536 N.E.2d 618, 539 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1989).
130. Id. at 914, 536 N.E.2d at 619, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
131. 420 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), afl'd by 435 N.W.2d 842 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1989).
132. 57 Cal. App. 3d 939, 129 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1976).
133. California Jury Instructions for measure of damages in personal injury cas-
es includes "[r]easonable compensation for any pain, discomfort, fears, anxiety and
other mental and emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff and of which his
injury was a legal proximate cause and for similar suffering reasonably certain to
be experienced in the future friom the same cause." BAJI 14.13 (7th ed.).
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awarding damages for such a loss, but whether a court could
instruct the jury on loss of enjoyment of life in addition to or
distinct from general damages."' 34 The court held that jury
instructions indicating loss of enjoyment of life were separate
and distinct damages from approved general damage catego-
ries in California potentially provided plaintiff with a double
recovery.3 5 Huff thus stands for the proposition that loss of
enjoyment of life damages should not be awarded as separate
recovery in personal injury cases arising in California
courts. 136
Huff was accordingly cited by Akers v. Kelley Co., 137 to jus-
tify disallowing recovery for loss of enjoyment of life, but the
court noted that "it does not appear fiom the record that the
award would have been reduced if the phrase 'loss of enjoy-
ment of life' had been omitted from the instruction." 38 This
indicates judicial realization that allowing hedonic testimony
will not necessarily result in duplicative awards, a fear
well-touted by hedonic damage critics.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Hedonic Damages in the United States
The monumental importance of hedonic damage theory is
most evident in two major premises underlying the theory, the
first point being that the hedonic value of a rich person is not
necessarily greater than that of a poor person.3 9 Secondly, a
person's hedonic value is independent of factors such as social
rank, education and wealth. 4 Hedonic theory fills a gap left
open by traditional damage remedies because it treats all hu-
man life equally. The traditional methods of evaluating dam-
ages consider the reality that a person of a certain
134. Hermes, Loss of Enjoyment of Life-Duplication of Damages Velsus Full Com-
pensation, 63 N.D.L. Rev. 561, 572 (1987).
135. Huff, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 943, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
136. Cf Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Roman v.
Richmond, 570 F. Stupp. 1554 (N.D. Cal. 1983). Both of these cases allowed loss
of enjoyment in a section 1983 action. Notably, Huff preceded both of these
cases.
137. 173 Cal. App. 3d 633, 219 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1985).
138. Id. at 655, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 527.
139. See supra note 73, at 72 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 73, at 72 and accompanying text.
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socio-economic background will earn more money than a per-
son from a more disadvantaged background. As a result of
awarding solely economic damages, therefore, a decreased
deterrent effect exists on unconstitutional behavior against the
poor. Not only do such methods have disparate impact across
social lines, these evaluations fall short of addressing other ele-
ments of human value. Since hedonic damages are indepen-
dent of pecuniary losses, a jury can award both economic and
loss of enjoyment of life damages, 14 1 thereby taking both
components into account.
Moreover, hedonic values can range from between three
to thirty times the economic value of a person. 142 Thus, ex-
cluding factors such as gender, wealth, lineage and social stat-
ure, and all other relevant factors being equal, hedonic theory
suggests that a poor person could have an equal or greater
hedonic loss than someone wealthier. The great equalizing
function of hedonic damages is that they cut across economic
barriers and value human life with a standard formula.
Admittedly, a major problem of hedonic damages lies in
the difficulty of assessing a proper recovery amount. Despite
this obstacle, courts should not be adverse to expanding he-
donic damage remedies out of fear of incorrectly measuring
the totality of life. They have discretion under section 1988 to
use state law when existing federal law is insufficient'13 and if
state law is still inadequate, precedent exists allowing them to
fashion their own remedies. 144 Thus, section 1983, under
which hedonic damages were first requested, does not pre-
clude federal judges from liberal awards. In fact, the section
encourages them: The court in Bell created a remedy because,
prior to that decision, no recovery for loss of life had tradition-
ally been allowed in the state court.' 4' The court fashioned
141. This is what happened in Sherrad v. Beny. The jury awarded $850,000 in
hedonic damages and $750,000 in pecuniary losses to the estate of the decedent.
Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159, 160 (N.D. III. 1985).
142. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
143. See § 1988, supra note 41. See also Carey v. Piplhus, 435 U.S. 247, 258
n.13 (1978).
144. See generally, supra notes 41-47 (discussion of section 1988).
This seemingly broad endowment of discretion is limited to creating reme-
dies only when corresponding state remedies are inadelilate. Carey v. Piphuis, 435
U.S. 247 (1978).
145. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1236 (7th Cir. 1984).
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the award to further both aims of section 1983-"compensation
for and deterrence of unconstitutional acts committed under
state law."146 The court correctly acted on its own initiative
to create a "federal rule responsive to the need whenever a
federal right is impaired." 4 ' While stressing the deterrence
aspect of section 1983 remedies, the court clearly considered
both prongs to be important elements of its decision.
Similarly, in Bass by Lewis v. Wallenstein, the court recog-
nized the importance of furthering the goals of section
1983.48 As in Bell, the court primarily focused on the deter-
ring effect of loss of enjoyment of life damages on wrongful
death, 49 but the court also looked at elements of compensa-
tion for the decedent's survivor. Other courts, like that decid-
ing Roman v. Richmond,5 ' which focused specifically on the
deterrence goal of section 1983,5' have concluded that a
damage amount for loss of life would deter unconstitutional depri-
vations of life.'52
Likewise, in Guyton v. Phillips,5 s the court decided that
in a section 1983 action, decedent's loss of enjoyment of life
was an injury for which the estate could seek recompense.. 54
The court stressed that federal judges should create remedies
to advance the policies of section 1983 when existing awards
prove insufficient. The Guyton court grappled with the inher-
ent difficulty of assessing the value of human life, but arrived
at the conclusion that it is possible to reach a monetary fig-
ure. 1
55
Finally, the court in Sherrod15G incorporated all of these
notions of the importance of section 1983 goals and recovery
under that section for loss of life. "Emphasizing that the mea-
sure or extent of the injury suffered may be uncertain does
146. Id. at 1239.
147. Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 240
(1969)).
148. Bass by Lewis v. Wallcnstci, 769 F.2d 1173, 1189-90 (7th Cir. 1985).
149. Id. at 1190.
150. 570 F. Supp. 1554 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
151. Id. at 1556-58.
152. Id. at 1557.
153. 532 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
154. Id. at 1168.
155. Id.
156. Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195, 205 (7th Cir. 1987).
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not bar recovery,"' 157 the court approved hedonic damages as
a valid award element in section 1983 actions.
158
These cases illustrate the importance courts place on com-
pensating the victims, and further, demonstrate that courts can
act on their own initiative to give proper damages under the
circumstances of the particular case and/or applicable statutes.
Courts should not hesitate to award hedonic damages merely
because they are a recent development in tort law and are
inherently controversial. Instead, judges should use powers
granted to them 159 and their best judgment to award fair and
just compensation. Every case that allowed loss of enjoyment
of life or hedonic damages stressed the importance of trying to
make the victim (possibly through the estate) whole. There is
an increasing tendency to broaden the concept of recovery
under wrongful death and survivors statutes,' 60 appropriately
so, considering that wrongful death acts are remedial in nature
and therefore should be construed liberally.' 6'
Moreover, the argument that evaluation of hedonic value
of life is too arbitrary to conclusively prove should not deter
the courts from awarding hedonic damages. Although some
speculation is inherent in the calculation of a decedent's loss
of enjoyment of life, uncertainty also exists in the determina-
tion of the well-established future income stream analysis.' 62
In other words, although it may be complicated to prove that a
decedent's loss of life's enjoyment is worth a certain dollar
amount, X, it is also difficult to determine that the decedent's
pure economic worth is clearly established as dollar amount, Y.
Courts feel more comfortable with the latter figure, undoubt-
edly because they simply fear creating even more uncertainty
in formulating damages.
Yet courts have stressed that while the value of life is diffi-
157. Id. at 206.
158. Id.
159. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1978).
160. Tarr, Illinois Juiy Awairls WHedonic' Damages, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 26, 1984, at
30 cot. 4 (quoting Arthur J. Sabin).
161. Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961).
162. Every state court wishes to determine the present value of the future in-
come stream of the decedent, had his life not been shortened as a result of the
wrongful killing. Since all courts are comfortable with this figure as a fairly "cer-
tain" element of pecuniary loss, it is a "well-establislhed" evidentiary figure.
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cult to establish, such a determination is not impossible 6
and the fact that "the measure or extent of the injury suffered
may be uncertain does not bar recovery."'6 4 For instance, the
Guyton court, while admitting inherent difficulties in ascer-
taining the value of life, held that loss of enjoyment of life
damages were not speculative. Courts are required only to do
the best they can, considering that in any "effort to translate
such catastrophic ... loss ... into money ... precision is not
achievable." 6 '
The United States Supreme Court has held 66 that a logi-
cal basis is required for awarding damages because "damages
based on [an] abstract value . . .are not a permissible element
of compensatory damages."' 67 The Supreme Court's appar-
ent concern is that juries will allow awards regardless of the
existence of an evidentiary basis to justify the amount. Howev-
er, expert testimony by economists and others can provide a
mathematical foundation for hedonic damages, thereby elimi-
nating speculative evidence.'6 The Sherrod court found "the
testimony of [the] expert economist ... invaluable to the jury
in enabling it to perform its function of determining the most
accurate and probable estimate of the damages."' 69 The
Stachura court feared that a jury could give duplicative or oth-
erwise excessive awards,' but judges give guidance to juries
when assessing awards and jurors can call upon personal
knowledge and expert testimony, as well as instructions from
the court.'71 Generally, juries award damages using their com-
mon sense based on the court's instructions. 2 Thus judges'
163. Rose v. Ford, 1937 App. Cas. 826, 859.
164. Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195, 206 (7th Cir. 1987).
165. Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226, 1228 (3d Cir. 1972).
166. Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
167. Id. at 310.
168. The Sherrod court noted that "[t]he fact that the hedonic value of a
human life is difficult to measure did not make either [plaintifrs expert witness]
Smith's testimony or the damages speculative." Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195,
206 (7th Cir. 1987), quoting Judge Leighton in Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp.
159, 164 (N.D. II. 1985).
169. Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195, 206 (7th Cir. 1087).
170. Stachura, 477 U.S. at 312-13.
171. C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES, Section 6, at 21, 24-28 (1935) (discussing roles
of judge and jury in assessing damages).
172. S. SPEISER, 2 RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 9:2 (2d ed. 1975) (dis-
cussing how juries arrive at damage calculations).
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instructions to juries can minimize the risks of excessive ver-
dicts.
Tort law recognizes the well-established principle of pro-
viding compensation to the estate for the tortious killing of the
decedent. 7 ' Yet, prior to loss of enjoyment of life cases, tort
remedies failed to compensate the estate for decedent's loss of
the pleasure of living and this new remedy effectively con-
fronts this inadequacy.174 To ignore the totality of a person's
existence and not compute damages beyond the pecuniary
losses leaves the estate insufficiently made whole-to the extent
money can possibly replace a person-for the harm suffered by
the decedent.
175
Similarly, the failure to award hedonic damages in section
1983 cases undermines that section's deterrence goal: If
tortfeasors do not have to pay the full cost of the victim's life,
they are not induced to act with less recklessness or negli-
gence. "To the extent that potential tortfeasors are aware of
the judgments that are imposed on actual tortfeasors, they will
treat the amount of those judgments as potential costs of their
own contemplated and possibly tortious conduct.' 76 The
Carey and Roman courts recognized that substantial compensa-
tory damages will have a chilling effect on would-be or actual
tortfeasors. 17 According to studies, such damages make gov-
ernmental actors more aware of their actions, and thus more
cautious or risk-averse since a decedent's estate will recover
more than previously allowed if states will allow hedonic dam-
age recovery.78 These same policy reasons extend to situa-
173. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (legislative enactment of stat-
utes to provide compensation).
174. See supra note 7 (definition of hedonic damages). See, e.g., Downie v. Unit-
ed States Line Co., 359 F.2d 344, 347-48 (3d Cir. 1966) (tort case disallowing loss
of life damages).
175. Significantly, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, with upwards
of 65,000 members, supports hedonic damage theory. Marcotte, Lost Pleasure Suit:
First personal injuty case to award hedonic damage settles, 76 A.B.A. J. 30 (Apr.,
1990).
176. Cohen, supra note 34, at 295-96.
177. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 256-57 (1978); Roman v. Richmond, 570 F.
Supp. 1554, 1557 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
178. See Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 464-67 (1978) (em-
phasizing compensation and deterrence policies of section 1983); Project, Suing the
Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 810-17 (deterrence effect of section
1983).
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tions outside section 1983 cases as well. State wrongful death
statutes should focus on allowing hedonic damages, however,
for compensation purposes rather than as deterrence of future
tortfeasors.179
Most states allow loss of enjoyment of life damages as ei-
ther a separate category of recovery or as a component of
some other type of general damages, such as pain and suffer-
ing."' Clearly, state legislatures and judiciaries espouse the
principles behind hedonic damage theory, but differ on classifi-
cation. That is, while many courts admit testimony on the lost
pleasure of life, they differ on the issue of what kind of dam-
age the evidence goes to prove: separate hedonic damages, a
constituent of pain and suffering, or possibly as an element of
general damages.
Arguably, damages for a decedent's loss of life as a sepa-
rate component are a windfall to the estate because the dece-
dent cannot enjoy the benefit of the award,'' and so the sur-
vivors are getting far more recompense than they deserve.
However, American jurisprudence accepts the legal fiction that
the estate is only the representative of the deceased. 8 2 Essen-
tially, the estate "stands in" for the decedent. A tortfeasor his-
179. The clear purpose of hedonic damages is to compensate a decedent's
estate for the loss of the pleasures of living. Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159,
162-64 (N.D. Ill. 1985). This is consistent with the purpose of wrongful death
statutes, which is to compensate "the wrong to the beneficiaries." See supra note
16 for the definition of wrongful death statutes.
180. Courts in the following states allow hedonic recovery as part of the pain
and suffering category: Alaska, Arkansas, California, District of Columbia, Georgia,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Sourth Dakota, Utah, and Washington.
Courts in the following states allow hedonic damages as a separate element
of recovery: Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia,
Wisconsin and Wyoming.
Kansas prohibits any recovery of hedonic damages at all.
Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Idiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, and Vermont have various hybrid interpre-
tations. M. Brookshire & S. Smith, ECONO. IC/1-1EDONIc DAMAGES, 256-57 (1990).
181. Such was suggested in Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108 (4th Cir.
1983). The court, observing how a comatose plaintiff could not enjoy the benefits
of the jury award, claimed that the damages would constitute a windfall for the es-
tate. Id. at 111. Since the plaintiff could not enjoy the awards, the damages were
essentially punitive in nature. Id.
182. See SPEISER, supra note 172, at § 14.1 (discussing legal fiction of state
survival statutes).
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1813torically owes the victim money damages, and no valid rea-
son exists to save the wrongdoer from paying his redresses
simply because it is the representative of the decedent and not
the decedent himself who will collect the award. The inconsis-
tency in the argument of the "windfall" proponents is that the
decedent cannot enjoy the benefit of any award. That is, if a
decedent cannot enjoy an award for hedonic damages, she also
could not enjoy damages for pain and suffering, economic
loss, or any other type of damage currently allowed. Yet those
awards are routinely given.'84 Surely those commentators ad-
vocating this "windfall to the estate" position would not en-
deavor to claim that the estate is not entitled to anything from
the tortfeasor as a result of the decedent being wrongfully
killed. The legal fiction of representation exists to make sure
the tortfeasor pays his victim, albeit through his estate, some
compensation. Given this, hedonic damages do not create a
windfall to the survivors any more than do other, more widely
accepted, damage remedies.
B. Hedonic Damages in California
The future of hedonic damages in unclear in California.
Sherrod was based on the hedonic value of the decedent if he
had lived and allowed recovery to the decedent's father in his
capacity as executor 8 5 of the estate.8 6 The wrongful death
statute in California does not permit a beneficiary to receive
those damages which are recoverable by the estate. 181 In
states like California where an heir cannot recoup damages ob-
tainable by the estate, the heir must show the hedonic value he
would have received from the decedent's life. In California, the
survivors maintain an action on their own behalf, but hedonic
183. See MCCORMICK, supra note 171, at 21-24 (discussion of' money damages
in British law).
184. See supra note 180 for list of states and their respective damage recover-
ics.
185. Executor is defined as "[a] person appointed by a testator to carry out
the directions and requests in his will, and to dispose of the property according
to his testamentary provisions after his decease." BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 511.
186. Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Stpp. 159, 163 (7th Cir. 1985).
187. Section 377, supra note 102. Note especially the last sentence, which pre-
cludes a beneficiary to receive those damages the estate may recoup. Section 377
clearly states that the decedent's heirs or representatives maintain an action
against the tortfeasor on their own behalf, not on behalf of the decedent.
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damages reflect the loss to the decedent. Thus, to recover he-
donic damages, the survivors must show their derivative value
of the decedent's hedonic loss. This figure could be calculated
in terms of a percentage of decedent's hedonic value or by
some other formula.' Generally, California has a strong his-
tory of judicial control in damage theory, and at least one
justice is of the opinion that "nothing in the [damage] statute
or its history ... forbids the evolution of recovery for wrong-
ful death into a universally recognized right of common law
status." 89
If the California legislature will not reform damage stat-
utes, the burden will be on the courts to interpret existing laws
so as to expand hedonic remedies to California plaintiffs. The
importance of this fact is that courts in this state are generally
perceived as leaders in tort law evolution and a California
court allowing hedonic damages would likely induce other
courts to do the same.19 Notable too is the fact that Califor-
nia juries are among the most generous juries in the
country.' 9 '
IV. PROPOSAL
Appropriately, courts should evaluate closely the actual
loss of enjoyment of life suffered by a plaintiff in wrongful
death or personal injury cases. 192 An attempt to create an ar-
bitrary ceiling figure or conventional sum, as English courts
did, will undermine some of the very principles hedonic dam-
ages hopes to promote. If courts create a maximum hedonic
damage level, the amount may be insufficient to compensate
the plaintiff or estate, which clearly fails to satisfy one of the
188. Comment, Wrongful Death Damages in California: On the Brink of Full Com-
pensation, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1003, 1020 n.121 (1978).
189. Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 586, 565 P.2d 122, 136, 139 Cal. Rptr.
97, 111 (1977) (Tobriner, Acting CJ., concurring).
190. See, e.g., Dawson v. Hill & Hill Truck Lines, 671 P.2d 589 (Mont. 1983).
Justice Weber, in his dissenting opinion, noted how tile Montana Supreme Court
should not allow damages for mental anguish because California courts have
refused to allow them.
191. Other states where the largest verdicts are typically awarded are New
York, Florida, Texas, Michigan, Illinois, and Pennsylvania. Frank, Trends in
Million-Dollar Verdicts, 70 A.B.A. J. 52, 54 (Sept., 1984).
192. E.g., Buoy v. ERA Helicopters, Inc., 771 P.2d 439 (Alaska 1989). The
court denied recovery for loss of enjoyment of life because the plaintiff did not
prove that there was a significant loss.
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theory's principal goals. It may also undermine the deterrence
aspect as well, if a tortfeasor finds the ceiling figure "cheap"
compared to altering his actions.
On the other hand, if a jury arbitrarily awards the maxi-
mum level allowed without clearly considering the hedonic
component suffered, the result is essentially a punitive damage
against the defendant. The jury may award an "extra" amount
of damages, measured as the difference between the ceiling
amount the jury could, and did, award, and the actual hedonic
damages that should have been awarded. For instance, suppose
a jury is authorized to award hedonic damages up to a figure
of $1 million, and ajury arbitrarily awards that much. Further,
if they were conscientious jurors and under the evidentiary
basis they possessed, they would have only awarded $900,000,
there is a discrepancy of $100,000. This amount is really a dis-
guised award for punitive damages, or some other type of
windfall, because under relevant evidence, the estate did not
deserve that extra $100,000. If the state allows punitive damag-
es, they will probably award them to the victim. To give the
extra amount is to duplicate the punitive damages awarded.
Hedonic damages are a separate remedy not already cov-
ered by existing remedies, and they serve no purpose if they
do not compensate the estate. Courts- act correctly in clearly
establishing what was the actual amount suffered, and legisla-
tures act in derogation of hedonic damage principles to allow
a ceiling amount that does not require a jury to carefully con-
sider the harm to the decedent.
Legislatures should reconsider wrongful death, survivors'
or other damage statutes so as to possibly include hedonic
damages. In discussing the issue, legislators will most certainly
consider the incentives of restricting government misconduct
in section 1983 actions by the passage of hedonic damages as a
statutory remedy.' Legislative reconsideration has the addi-
tional benefit of effectively abolishing any confusion existing in
the courts since the judicial branch is restricted by the express
pronouncements of the legislatures. Thus, the legislative
branch can effectively quiet the controversy by amending state
wrongful death statutes.
The state legislatures should act to expand existing stat-
193. See Cohen, supra note 34.
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utes and allow for hedonic damage recovery. Some states, like
California, allow damages that are "just under the circumstanc-
es"194 and those statutes could be modified to read:
In every action under this section, such damages may be
given as under all the circumstances of the case may be
just. These damages may be awarded if adequately proved
by any relevant evidence.
Any restrictions on damages of a non-pecuniary nature
could be removed from statutes as well. These steps could be
taken to let the judicial branch know that the legislature ap-
proves of less restrictive damage awards.
Some commentators are apparently concerned that the
plaintiffs will get a windfall if hedonic damages are allowed,
that more than enough money will be given to compensate,
and that hedonic damages are little more than a disguised
punitive award. This is an issue which the legislatures should
also consider, by specifically altering state remedies systems. As
it currently stands in California civil cases, what 'the jury de-
cides to be proper compensation to the estate is the same
amount used to punish the defendant." 5 That is, a jury de-
cides on a figure designed to both sufficiently compensate the
estate and punish the wrongdoer. Perhaps juries should be
instructed to consider the two amounts separately: How much
should the defendant pay so as to be deterred from future
misconduct? How much should the decedent, via the estate, re-
ceive so as to be compensated for her loss? If the amounts are
equal, the judge can direct the entire amount be given to the
plaintiffs. If not, the difference between the "deterrence" dam-
ages and the "compensation" amount can go to a public wel-
fare fund to be used for designated social programs. To illus-
trate, suppose a jury decides that $10 million will compensate
the decedent's estate, but that $15 million is required for the
tortfeasor to alter its behavior. The estate will recover $10
million and the remaining $5 million will go to a specially de-
signed general fund, almost as a fine. The advantage to this
194. For the California wrongful death statute, see supra note 102.
195. California Jury Instructions Civil read that "[i]f you return a verdict
against the defendant, it shall be in a single sum, representing the aggregate of
the present cash value of the loss suffered by the heirs of the deceased." BAJI
14.71 (6th ed. 1977).
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system is that both aims of section 1983 are well-met: The
victim is adequately compensated and the tortfeasor is de-
terred from this type of behavior in the future. Juries should
be allowed to consider the amount necessary to compensate
the decedent independently of punitive considerations. Thus, he-
donic testimony can be introduced without fear that it will lead
to a disguised punitive remedy, because the jury will consider
the deterrence amounts independently of what enjoyment of
life the victim has lost. Further, the court can maintain a rein
on juries by instructing whether the evidence goes to a particu-
lar well-established damage category-such as pain and suffer-
ing-or if it can be evaluated independently as hedonic dam-
ages.
V. CONCLUSION
Clearly, hedonic damage law is far from settled, even in
those states with more liberal recovery laws, due to the specu-
lative nature of the theory. Equally obvious is that while courts
constrain themselves to only grant damages for pecuniary loss,
there is little chance for adoption of hedonic damage theory. It
is certainly shocking to juries to now be asked to reach deep
into the defendant's pockets and award even greater damages
on a new and controversial theory when more million-dollar
verdicts are being awarded than ever before. But the history
behind hedonic damages suggests that this is a good policy and
serves vital functions in society. Greater frequency of cases
under section 1983 will lead courts to accept that a person is
worth more than purely economic data indicates, and that it
will compensate the estate to award this intangible amount. As
greater numbers of plaintiffs bring suits under wrongful death
cases and personal injury cases, as is happening now, the more
enlightened courts will grant recovery in even broader scope.
Since loss of enjoyment of life damages are so new, skepticism
is only natural, but hopefully, this reticence of the courts will
fade with time. As more case law develops, and statutes are
reformed by the legislatures, hedonic damage theory should
become a staple and welcome addition to tort damages.
Jennifer L. Jones
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